

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XCDS~~

August 2, 1978

Memo No. 798-78

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 


SUBJECT: Sadat on 242

On the cable at Tab A you asked for confirmation of Roy Atherton's view that Sadat is no longer prepared to settle for ambiguity on the question of return of territory by Israel, that he is now insisting on language that would stipulate no changes in the international borders as they were before 1967 with the return of most of the West Bank to Jordan.


I discussed this point with Hal Saunders on the secure phone on August 2. Hal in turn had just finished a call to Roy Atherton. Roy and Hal together agree that there is a hardening in Sadat's position, that ambiguous 242 language will no longer suffice, that Sadat now believes he must have language calling for Israel's return to the 67 borders with no more than minor modifications or words to that effect.

The pressures on Sadat that apparently have led to this hardening of his position are examined in today's State/INR analysis of Arab-Israeli developments (Tab B).

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For: Rac Project
ESLN; NLC-133-60-1-2-4
BY:  NARA DATE 8/8/2013







DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD~~

To : The Secretary

From: INR - William G. Bowdler
NEA - Harold H. Saunders

Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments
No. 523, August 2, 1978

We are seeing increasing indications that, under strong pressure from the moderate Arab states and from within his own government, Sadat is finding it difficult to defend the continuation of his peace initiative and seems positioning himself for a shift in Egyptian policy.

Since Sadat first announced that he would go to Jerusalem, his critics have warned that the Israelis were not prepared to offer terms for a settlement in line with UN Resolution 242 and that the US would not pressure the Israelis to accept such an agreement. As Sadat has pressed on over the past nine months, fewer and fewer Arabs, publicly or privately, supported him.

The Saudis and Algerian President Boumedienne have launched initiatives in favor of obtaining an Arab consensus and a return to a Geneva Conference format.

The Saudis, and most other Arab states, believe that the Israelis have had ample opportunity to become more flexible; instead their position has hardened.

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
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
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Recent tours of the region by Prince Fahd and Algerian President Boumedienne appear to have made significant headway in resolving the differences between Assad and Sadat. The key element in the reconciliation among the moderate Arab states that the Saudis want is the resolution of the dispute between Damascus and Cairo. (As you will recall, the Saudi-engineered Riyadh Summit of October 1976 brought 13 months of relative harmony in the Arab world which provided the political conditions necessary for initiating US peace efforts.)

Boumedienne met with Assad in Damascus in mid-July and then flew to Khartoum and conferred with Sadat during the OAU summit. He then returned to Damascus



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Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Mansouri told Ambassador West on July 24 that the only obstacle to Sadat's rehabilitation was his continuation of direct contacts with the Israelis.

Prince Fahd's current round of state visits to Cairo, Damascus, and Amman is apparently designed to bridge the gap which remains between Sadat and Assad. We believe that Fahd is making some progress along these lines; this is probably the reason he delayed his departure from Damascus.

While we, do not have a definite indication about the results of Fahd's approaches, it is clear that Sadat will have difficulty continuing his initiative. Mansouri said, prior to the meeting at Leeds, that the Egyptian President had asked the Arab Solidarity Committee to give his initiative until October in order to gain concessions

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from Israel that would justify it. In view of the Saudi-backed push for Arab reconciliation, Sadat may not be able to pursue his initiative even that long.

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